Concepts and Methods in Multi-Person Coordination and Control by Basar, Tamer & Cruz, Jose B., Jr.
Unclassified
. S E C U R IT Y  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N  O F  T H I S  P A G E  (When Date Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. R E P O R T  N U M B E R 2. G O V T  A C C E S S IO N  NO, 3. R E C I P I E N T ’S C A T A L O G  N U M B E R
4. T I T L E  (and Subtitle)
CONCEPTS AND METHODS IN MULTI-PERSON 
COORDINATION AND CONTROL
5. T Y P E  O F  R E P O R T  & P E R I O D  C O V E R E D
Technical Report
6. P E R F O R M I N G  O R G.  R E P O R T  N U M B E R
R-920(DC-49); UILU-ENG-81-2251
7. AU T H O R f s)
Tamer Basar and Jose B. Cruz, Jr.




10. PR O G R A -M  E L E M E N T ,  P R O J E C T ,  T A S K  
A R E A  & W O R K  U N IT  N U M B E R S
9. P E R F O R M I N G  O R G A N I Z A T I O N  N A M E  A N D  A D D R E S S
Coordinated Science Laboratory 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Urbana, Illinois 61801
11. C O N T R O L L I N G  O F F I C E  N A M E  A N D  A D D R E S S
Joint Services Electronics Program
12. R E P O R T  D A T E
Qcto.be.r. 19.8.1.
13. N U M B E R  O F  P A G E S
77
14. M O N IT O R I N G  A G E N C Y  N A M E  a  A D D R E S S f i /  different from Controlling Office) 15. S E C U R I T Y  C L A S S ,  (of this report)
Unclassified
15a. D E C L A S S I  FI C A T IO N / D O W N  G R A D IN G  
S C H E D U L E
16. D I S T R I B U T I O N  S T A T E M E N T  (of this Report)
Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.
17. D I S T R I B U T I O N  S T A T E M E N T  (of the abstract entered in B lo c k  20, if different from Report)
18. S U P P L E M E N T A R Y  N O T E S
19. K E Y  W O R D S  (Continue on reverse side if necessary  and identify by b lock number)
Dynamic games, Information structures, Cooperative equilibria, Noncooperative 
equilibrium, Stackelberg (Leader-Follower) solution concept, Nash solution 
concept, Stochastic team problems
20. A B S T R A C T  (Continue on reverse side If  necessary  and identify by b lock number)
In this paper we discuss some key concepts and methods relevant to multi­
person decision-making and optimization in deterministic and stochastic 
dynamic systems. Specifically, we consider systems defined in discrete­
time, and treat the team, Nash and Stackelberg (leader-follower) solution 
concepts under different information structures. We provide an up-to-date 
survey of the literature on these topics, and also present some new results.
DD ^F O R M  AN 73 1473 E D IT IO N  O F  1 N O V  65 IS O B S O L E T E Unclassified
S E C U R I T Y  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N  O F  T H IS  P A G E  (When Data Entered)
S E C U R IT Y  C L A S S IF IC A T IO N  OF T H IS  P A O E C W fn  Data Entered)
S E C U R I T Y  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N  O F  T H IS  P  AGEfWTien Data Entered)
UILU-ENG-81-2251
CONCEPTS AND METHODS IN MULTI-PERSON COORDINATION AND CONTROL
by
Tamer Basar and Jose B. Cruz, Jr.
This work was supported in part by the Joint Services Electronics 
Program under Contract N00014-79-C-0424; in part by the National Science 
Foundation under Grant ECS-79-19396; and in part by the U. S. Air Force 
under Grant AFOSR 78-3633.
Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the 
United States Government
Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.
CONCEPTS AND METHODS IN MULTI-PERSON 
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Abstract
In this chapter we discuss some key concepts and methods relevant 
to multi-person decision-making and optimization in deterministic and sto­
chastic dynamic systems. Specifically, we consider systems defined in 
discrete-time, and treat the team, Nash and Stackelberg (leader-follower) 
solution concepts under different information structures. We provide an 
up-to-date survey of the literature on these topics, and also present some 
new results.
*
This paper will appear as a chapter of the book "Optimization and 




Much of decision and control theory is concerned with a single 
decision-maker with a single objective function. Multiple objective functions 
have been considered also, but usually these are associated with a single 
decision-maker. Large scale systems and dynamic operations research models 
are likely to have a multiplicity of decision-makers. Each decision-maker 
may have multiple objectives. Even when each decision-maker has only one 
objective function, the optimization problem is significantly much more complex 
than that for a situation with only one decision-maker.
This chapter provides a discussion of some of the key concepts and 
methods that are appropriate to multiperson decision-making. When two or 
more decision-makers have separate objective functions, it is generally not 
possible to simultaneously optimize all the objective functions. One 
important exception is the case when all the objective functions are the 
same. Even in this case, the information available to each decision maker 
may be different from those available to others, and the problem of determining 
the mapping from the information space to the decision space for each 
decision-maker is more complex than that for a central decision-maker.
When cooperation among the decision-makers can be expected, an 
appropriate solution concept is that of Pareto-optimality. Otherwise, a 
natural concept is that of Nash equilibrium. In situations where a hier­
archical decision structure is relevant, the Stackelberg or leader-follower 
concept is useful. These concepts will be discussed in both a deterministic 
and a stochastic setting.
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In Section 2 we set the stage by providing motivational examples, 
modeling the multiperson decision problem, and defining the various solution 
concepts. In Section 3 we develop the concepts and methods appropriate for 
multiperson decision problems in deterministic systems and deterministic 
operations research models. The stochastic decision problem is formulated 
and treated in detail in Section 4. Section 5 briefly describes some exam­
ples, and Section 6 includes some concluding remarks. An extensive bibliog­
raphy is included at the end of the chapter.
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2. MULTI-PERSON DECISION PROBLEMS
In this section we provide a general discussion on the formulation 
of multi-person, and possibly multicriteria, coordination and control problems 
that involve uncertainty, informational decentralization and possible conflicts 
of interests (among the decision makers). We also discuss possible solution 
concepts for such decision problems. Before going into a formal presentation, 
let us first consider a few examples (in Section 2.1) to motivate the general 
formulation in the sequel.
2.1. Examples for Motivation
a) Optimum resource allocation under uncertainty
Consider a firm with (for simplicity) two divisions. The upper- 
level division (the headquarters) has the task of coordinating the units (of 
production) at the lower-level division, under incomplete information as 
regards to their production capabilities, availability, and quantity of 
resources, etc. Furthermore, there are m common resources which are to be 
used by some or all units in production, and therefore the headquarters has 
to allocate these to the units in accordance with their needs. The units may 
communicate their needs to the headquarters; and based on this information and 
some other measurements, the headquarters will have to decide on the optimal 
allocation that maximizes the profit to the firm (or some other appropriate 
utility function). One other task of the headquarters is to design an 
incentive scheme for remuneration of the production units, which will induce 
each such unit to report his true need (i.e. not to cheat in his transmittal 
of information) and to utilize the allocated resources most efficiently (so as,
4
say, to maximize the unit’s share of the profit of the firm). An optimum 
coordination effort on the part of the headquarters will therefore force the 
units to behave as a team, even though the units may have their somewhat 
different objectives (from that of the headquarters) and operate under 
decentralized information.
This problem is one of multi-person coordination and control, which 
exhibits a hierarchy in decision making— the coordinator (headquarters) being 
in a position to dictate his policy on the other decision-makers (the units of 
the lower-level division). It also involves incomplete information, uncertainty 
and a dynamic decision process with multi criteria, 
b . Arms race between two nations
There is a dynamic model— known as Richardson's arms race model [117]- 
which describes qualitatively the armament buildup between two nations and in 
which the decision variables may be taken as the rates of increases or 
decreases in the armament levels. In making its decision as to whether to 
increase or decrease its current armament level, each nation will have to 
take a few factors into account, namely (i) the current armament level of the 
other nation, (ii) the economic burden associated with any possible increase 
in the current armament level, (iii) the response history of the other nation 
to past armament policies, and (iv) uncertainty associated with all this 
information. Yet another factor that affects the decision process is the 
nations’ grievances and hatreds towards their ’’opponents". The objective of 
each nation will be to maximize an expected utility function that reflects a 
tradeoff between expected economic prosperity and national security.
This is clearly a dynamic decision process which involves two decision 
makers with different objectives and whose decisions are intercoupled. It
5
involves uncertainty, incomplete information and noncooperative decision 
making.
c . Water pollution control
There are M chemical plants, located on the shores of a river, whose 
waste discharges pour directly into the river with no (or very little) pollution 
treatment. The municipality decides to take measures against this, either 
through a subsidy program or by penalizing those who do not properly treat 
their waste discharge. Assuming that the municipality is in a position to 
collect data from the river, the question is what type of a subsidy (or 
penalty) program to adopt, which will force the chemical plants to treat their 
waste discharges properly so that the pollution content of the river is below 
certain preset limits which become more stringent over the years. This is a 
dynamic multi-person decision problem which involves uncertainty and multi 
criteria. There is a conflict of interest between the municipality and the 
chemical plants, and there may also be some conflicts of intersts between the 
individual plants.
2.2. A General Formulation
A general formulation of a multi-person decision problem requires 
delineation of the following information:
(i) A set of decision makers (DMs), or the so called agents. Denote 
this set by M={1,2,..,M} and a typical element by m.
(ii) An underlying probability space (Q ,(B9<P) for the uncertainties, 
which are beyond the control of the DMs.
(iii) The length of the horizon on which the decision process is 
defined. Here we will adopt a discrete-time formulation with a finite horizon,
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and denote the number of stages by N. Let a typical element of N= {1,..,N} 
be denoted by n.
(iv) A set of possible alternatives (decisions) for DM m at stage
n, to be denoted by U111, with um £ U m being a typical element. In the mostn n n yr
general setting, U™ may depend on the present and past decisions of the other
agents (i.e. it may not be rectangular); but here we will assume U111 to ben
rectangular for every n£ N, m£ M.
(v) A mathematical description of the interaction of the DMs 
within the system and among themselves, and with the uncertain states of the 
environment, i.e. specification of a system equation of the type
z  , 1 M Q .
X rv4-1 =  f  ( X » 1* »  * * * » U  » 6 )n+1 n n n n n ( 2 . 1)
where x ^ x ^ ^ G X  (the state space), and 0^ denotes the uncertainty affecting
the outcome of the decisions at stage n. An alternate description would be
specification of the probability distribution of x^+^ conditioned on the set 
1 Mnof vectors {x ,u ,...,u }; but we will adopt the state-space description (2.1). n n n
(vi) An information structure for each DM, which characterizes the
precise static or dynamic information gained and recalled by that DM at each
stage of the decision process. Each such information structure will generate
an appropriate information space (say Zm) for DM m at stage n. In the casen
of deterministic information patterns, each DM will have access to some or
all components of the present and past values of the state vector, as well
as to the past control values of some of the other DMs. In the case of
stochastic information patterns, DMs will have access to noise corrupted
measurements of the state vector, say
m •, m f q®\ y_ = h ( x , 0 )  n n n n (2. 2)
7
, mfor DM m at stage n, where 0^ denotes the uncertainty corrupting the measure­
rsment. Then, the information available to DM m at stage n (denoted T] ) will
m 1 M
* * * * ,jrn-l* ‘ ’ * ;yl* * ‘ * 1comprise a sub-collection of the set of vectors ^yn »yn_^
1 M 1 M tu -,...,u _;...;u_,...,u,}. If all these vectors take values in finite- n-1 n-1 1 1
dimensional spaces, then the information space Z™ will also be finite 
dimensional. [Further discussion will be devoted to this topic in the 
following sections; see in particular Section 4.1.]
(vii) Permissible strategies (decision laws) for each DM, defined
as appropriate mappings from his information space into his decision space.
m , m m m, m m TTm , _ . TT -Let tt = {v, ,y_ ,. .. ,y„} , where y : Z -> U is a measurable mapping. We refer 1 2  N n n n
to tt111 as a strategy (decision law, control law) of DM m, and denote the class 
of all permissible strategies for DM m by nm . Each permissible sub-strategy 
y™ will be assumed to belong to a sub-strategy set T™ which will have to be 
appropriately defined for the problem under consideration.
Permissible strategies, as introduced above, are also known as pure 
strategies, as opposed to mixed strategies which are defined as probability
M
►y-.;
N mmeasures on X Y , or behavioral strategies which are defined as independent 
n=l n
„mprobability measures on nGN. In the sequel we will deal only with pure
strategies and refer to them simply as strategies.
(viii) An objective functional for each DM, that summarizes
(mathematically) his preference ordering among different alternatives and for
each fixed permissible strategy of the remaining DMs. Hence, we assume
rn 1 2 Mexistence of a real-valued function : n X I1 f°r ea°h m€: M, which
DM m strives to optimize (say minimize) by his choice of strategy 7rm £ n m .
Note that the effect of uncertainty (if any) is absorbed in this formulation 
through a possible expected utility approach. This point will be further
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discussed in Section 4, where a more precise description for a subclass of 
problems can be found.
We should note in passing that, in the class of problems described 
above, the order in which each agent acts is predetermined; there exist more 
general formulations, however, [see, Witsenhausen (1971a)] which would allow for 
the order of action to be determined by a chance mechanism (which is a part of 
the uncertainty) and the past actions of the agents. We do not discuss such 
generalizations here.
2.3. Solution Concepts
The general formulation of Section 2.2 is not complete unless we 
specify the precise mode of decision making among the agents. Even though each 
agent will attempt to minimize his corresponding objective functional, this 
goal cannot certainly be achieved independently of the decisions of the other 
agents, unless the objective functional of that DM happens to be independent of 
all the other DMs ’ strategies. Hence, in order to complete the formulation of 
a multi-person decision problem, we have to introduce rational modes of decision 
making. Some selective possibilities are discussed in the sequel.
Team solution
When all agents have a common goal, we have a team problem with a
1  ̂ ^
single objective functional J e J E J E...E J and then an optimum (team)
. 1* m *
s o l u t i o n  tt =  { 7T , . .  .  , tt }  i s  d e f i n e d  b y
J(tt*) < J(tt) , ¥ttg n (2.3)
where we use the notation ttGII to denote {n^G Iim , mGM}.
9
In this context, a solution concept that is somewhat weaker than the 
team solution is that of person-by-person optimality. Let tt =
{tt\  .. . ,7rm "̂,7Tm+1,.. . ,ttM } . Then, tt*g  n is person-by-person optimal if, for
all me M,
- 111/ ftv —ill / ft ilivJ (tt ) < J (tt*,tt ) , m
m „mtt g  n , (2.4)




When the agents do not all have the same goal, but still act
cooperatively, a reasonable equilibrium concept is provided by the Pareto-
optimal solution. We call a subset II C II a Pareto-optimal set if there exists
no element in II which is dominated by a strategy from n, i.e. there does not
exist tt g  II and ttgII with the property 
P
and
Jm (7r) < Jm (ir ) VmG M
P
(2.5)
J1(tt) < J1(tt ) for at least one Ig M
P
In other words, II is the collection of nondominated strategies in II.
P
Any element of the Pareto-optimal set is known as the Pareto-optimal 
solution for the problem under consideration, which is in general not unique. 
Under certain conditions [see DaCunha and Polak (1967)], the set of Pareto- 
optimal solutions can be obtained by considering a convex combination of the
M
J = E X J 
 ̂ m=l m
m 0 < X < 1, m
M
E X = 1, 
m=l m
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and by minimizing J^(tt) over II, and for fixed (X^,...,A^). This yields a 
solution which is parameterized by X, which generates the Pareto-optimal set.
It should be noted that a critical assumption in Pareto-optimality 
is cooperation. Specifically, if tt* is a Pareto-optimal solution adopted by 
all the agents, one of them, say the m Tth one, may attain a better performance 
by minimizing
A * * , * ” )m
over nm ; but he has to refrain from adopting this policy (under the cooperative 
mood of decision making) since a better performance for one DM (at a Pareto 
solution point) necessarily implies a worse performance for some other DM.
Nash equilibrium solution
When cooperation cannot be enforced in a multi-person multi-criteria 
decision problem, a solution concept that safeguards against cheating by a 
single DM is the Nash equilibrium. We say that an M-tuple of strategies 
Tr*={7r ,..,tt } provides a Nash equilibrium solution if, for all m e  M,
_m, m, * m* m mJ (iT ) < J (iT ,7T ) , TT e n . m (2 .6)
Note that, for the special case when Jm , m e  M, are identical, this solution 
concept coincides with person-by-person optimality; furthermore, when 
M={1,2}, and J^=-J2 = J, we have a single inequality
J (iT1* »TT2) < J (ir*) < JiTT1,^2*), TT1G n 1, ^  6 II2 (2.7)
which is known as the saddle-point inequality and the corresponding equilibrium 
solution is known as a saddle-point solution. This latter case characterizes
a situation in which the two DMs have completely conflicting goals.
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Stackelberg solution
Consider the class of systems with two agents and in which the roles
are not symmetric. One of the DMs, known as the leader, is in a position to
announce his strategy ahead of time and enforce it on the other DM, known as
1 1the follower. For each announced strategy, tt E II , of the leader, we assume 
that the follower acts rationally and determines his response by minimizing
t2/ 1 ^J (TT ,7T )
zover II . The set of all such solutions
1 9 * 9  9 1 ? *  2 1 2R(tt ) = { tt G n  : J  ( t t , tt ) < min J ( t t , tt )
TT2en2
( 2 . 8)
is known as the rational response (reaction) set of the follower. In case 
this is a singleton, we have the unique reaction function (mapping)
T : n1 E2, (2.9a)
so that the leader will now determine his equilibrium strategy by minimizing
J1(tt'1',Ttt1)
1 1* 1over n • Any strategy tt GII with the property
J ^ tt1* , ^ 1*) < J ^ tt̂ T tt1) , Vtt1 g  n1 (2.9b)
is known as a Stackelberg strategy for the leader. Note that T is determined 
here as the unique mapping satisfying
_2, 1 _ 1» T2, 1 2.J ( tt , T tt )  <  J ( tt , tt )  , 2 2 V tt G  n (2 .1 0 )
1 1  1 2  2 * 1* for every tt G n , and with the property T tt g  II . The strategy, tt = T tt , for
1*
the follower, that corresponds to tt under this mapping, is known as the 
equilibrium strategy of the follower under the Stackelberg mode of decision
making.
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If R ( tt^ )  is not a  singleton, there is no unique w a y  of defining
the Stackelberg solution. One possibility is for the leader to secure his
losses against nonunique rational responses of the follower, and accordingly 
1* 1to select a it G II that satisfies
sup J^(tt̂  ,tt̂ ) < sup J^(tt\ tt̂ ) , (2.11)
tt̂ r CttI*) t̂ GRCtt1)
for all Tr1e n1. This, we shall also call the Stackelberg strategy for the 
leader.
It is also possible to extend the Stackelberg solution concept to 
systems with more than two DMs and possibly more than two levels of hierarchy. 
In this extension, if there is more than one DM at any level of hierarchy, 
we have to adopt either the Pareto-optimality or the Nash solution as an 
equilibrium concept at that particular level. As a specific case, consider 
an M-person decision problem with one leader and M-l followers, and two levels 
of hierarchy. Suppose that there is no cooperation among the followers; then 
we adopt the Nash solution concept at the lower level of hierarchy and further 
assume that the Nash solution is unique for every tt̂ g  n \  Then, there exist 
M-l reaction functions T^ :IÎ ->IÎ , i=2,3,...,M, such that
Ti, 1 T „i 1> 1/ 1 T h  i it! • o O /o io \J ( it jTt̂ jT tt ) < J (tt ,iTi,TT ), tt ell , i=2,3,.. . ,M, (2.12a)
where
T r_2 1 J  1 i-1 1 i+1 1 „M 1,
TT^ = {T TT ,T TT ,...,T TT ,T IT ,...,T TT } . (2.12b)
A Stackelberg (hierarchical) strategy for the leader in this decision problem 
1*is a tt g  II that satisfies
T1, 1* 2 1* M 1* Tl, 1 2  1 M 1NJ ( tt ,T tt ,...,T tt )  < J ( tt ,T tt , .  .  . ,T tt ) (2.13)
for all tt̂ g  n1 .
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Decision problems that incorporate a hierarchy in decision making 
are also known as coordination problems, and the leader is referred to as 
the coordinator, since presence of a hierarchy enables him to coordinate 
the actions of the other decision makers. This is particularly true if the 
leader’s objective function comprises a convex combination of the objective 
functions of the followers, in which case a Stackelberg strategy may force 
the followers to a Pareto-optimal solution even though they will be acting 
noncooperatively. Such possibilities will be discussed in the sections to 
follow.
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3. COORDINATION AND CONTROL IN DETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS
In this section we discuss coordination and control problems in the 
context of deterministic systems and under deterministic information patterns. 
Firstly we identify deterministic problems within the framework of the formula­
tion of §2.2 and delineate several deterministic information patterns (see§3.1). 
Then, we provide a brief discussion on team and Pareto-optimal solutions and 
representations of strategies on trajectories(in §3.2), discuss Nash equilibria 
(in §3.3) and Stackelberg solutions (in §3.4); finally we discuss general coor­
dination and control problems in deterministic systems.
3.1 Deterministic Systems and Deterministic Information Patterns
The class of deterministic systems to be considered in this section 
will be a special case of the general formulation of §2.2, obtained by taking 
all probability measures to be one-point; in other words, we take the state 
equation to be given by
x = f„(x„>ul> • • >uM) > x ,x 6 &n ,n+I n n n n n n+i * (3.1)
with the value of x^, the initial state, specified a priori, and the stage- 
additive cost function to be given as
Tm 1 M v ! m. 1 M




If a decision maker has access to only the initial value of the state 
and does not acquire any (dynamic) information on the values of state (or con­
trols) at other stages, we say that he has open-loop information. If, however,
15
he acquires perfect information concerning the current values of the state and 
has perfect recall on the past acquired information, we say that his informa­
tion pattern is closed-loop (with memory). Hence, in the former case
for DMm, and these two information structures constitute the two extreme pos­
sibilities as regards deterministic information structures that involve state 
measurements. Two important cases "in between" are the feedback (or closed- 
loop no-memory) information structure in which case the decision maker recalls 
only the current value of the state (and also the initial state, which is 
known a priori), i.e.,
and the partial closed-loop information structure in which case the dynamic 
state information that the decision maker acquires and recalls is only partial, 
i.e.
T)™ = }, n G N (3.3a)
and in the latter case
(3.3b)
Tlm ■ {x ,x, }, n G N, m G M n n 1J (3.4)
(3.5a)
where
m , m . - — . _ —y = h (x ), n G N, n # 1, m G M, n n n (3.5b)
and h^ is an appropriate function which is not necessarily one-to-one. Note
16
that in the partial closed-loop information structure each decision maker's 
current observation (or measurement) may be different, and there is in 
general no sharing of information. An information structure which permits 
such sharing is, for example,
where
t  -i £ ,n n-l’yn-2 ,.v,y2,x1}
t V : V ^ ky j
(3.6a)
3.6b)
which is known as the one-step delay observation sharing pattern. It is, 
of course, possible to introduce other information patterns which involve 
sharing of only a subset of past observations and with possibly more than 
one stage delay. Each such information structure leads to an appropriate 
strategy space for each decision maker, for which we use the notation already 
introduced in §2.2.
3.2 Team and Pareto-optimal Solutions
When all agents have a common goal (the case of a team problem) or 
have different goals but act cooperatively (the case of Pareto-optimal solu­
tion), the optimum solution can be obtained by utilizing techniques of optimal 
control theory since in the former case there is a single objective functional 
to be minimized and in the latter case one may in general consider a parame­
terized convex combination of all the agents' cost functionals as a single 
objective functional to be minimized, whose parameterized solution character­
izes the Pareto-optimal set. Furthermore, in order to obtain a solution under
17
a given general deterministic information pattern, a standard approach is 
first to obtain the minimizing solution under the open-loop information struc­
ture and then to synthesize a closed-loop solution as a representation of that 
open-loop solution in the strategy spaces compatible with the given dynamic 
information. Before discussing this point further, let us introduce the 
notion of "representations" of a strategy [cf. Ba$ar (1980b)].
Definition 3.1. For an M-agent deterministic control (decision) problem with_ f
strategy spaces [nm ; m € M ] , let the strategies of all the agents, except the
mth one, be fixed at tt*- € n^, i € M, i ^ m. Then, a strategy rrm £ nm for DMm
~m m i i —is a representation of another strategy tt € TI , with tt €11 (i € M, i ^ m ) 
fixed, if
(i) the M-tuples {tt31,tt̂ *; i € M, i ^ m} and {tt111,tt**"; i € M, i ^ m ]
generate the same unique state trajectory, and 
m ~m(ii) tt and tt have the same open-loop value on this trajectory. □
A salient feature of team-optimal and Pareto-optimal solutions is
that under a given dynamic deterministic information structure, every repre­
sentation of a solution M-tuple also constitutes a solution to the problem. 
However, in the cases of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg solutions, this pro­
perty no longer holds true.
3.3. Nash Equilibria
Derivation of Nash equilibria, when M agents have different cost 
functionals to minimize, involve the solution of the set of M inequalities (2.6), 
which, depending on the underlying information structure, may be quite a dif­
ficult problem, because each inequality defines an optimal control problem
18
that depends structurally on the other agents' strategies. However, if the 
underlying information pattern is open-loop, the structure of each of these 
optimal control problems is not affected by the other agents' control vectors, 
and hence derivation of Nash equilibria in this case becomes equivalent to 
solving (jointly) M optimal control problems. This argument then readily 
leads, by using the minimum principle, to the following set of first-order 
necessary conditions that yield the candidate open-loop Nash equilibrium so­
lutions [cf. Ba$ar (1979a)].
Proposition 3.1. For the multicriteria decision problem described by (3.1)
and (3.2), let fn<xn >u*, • • and 8n (xn+l’V  * * ’un ,xn) be continuously dif“ 
ferentiable in x^, and x^^, n € N, m € M. Then, if {rr111 (x^) = um ; m 6 M ] 
provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution and n € N } is the
corresponding state trajectory, there exists a finite sequence of costate




= f (x ,u ,..,u ) , X- = X n n n n 1 1
*
m
Yn (xl> = u
m arg min
m c Trmu t U n n
TT131/ 131 1H (p ,-,u . n vrn+l’ n
m-1',un
m,u ,u * n’ n
m+1 * *M.,u ,x ) * n n7
m
5n
d r ✓ * 1 M . ’ _ m
Bx n n* n n Ltn+1 L̂ xn u ■n+1
i  im, * 1 M *. '
g  (x . i > u  y • &  > x  ) ] ]  n n+1 n n n7 J J
+ [d m. * 1 M *v.--- g (x (1,u , . . ,U , X )]dx n n+1 n * * n * n7Jn
m
PN+1 =  0 , m € M, n 6 N,
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where
m„-v 1 M x A m-- 1 M x 1 M xH (p ..,,11 ,..,u ,x ) i g f (x ,u ,. . ,u ) ,u ,..,u , x ) n rn+l n* n’ n7 ■ °nL n n n ’ n7J n’ ’ n n7
+ Pm ,-f, (x ,u\..,uM); n 6 N, m 6 M. n+1 n x n n * n7 * ’ □
For further discussion on the derivation of this set of first-order necessary 
conditions, and elucidation of some special cases as regards the structures of 
f and g“ , we refer to (Ba$ar and Olsder (1982), chapter 6).
Another tractable class of problems, as far as derivation of Nash 
equilibria is concerned, is the class of multicriteria decision problems with 
closed-loop no-memory (feedback) information structure. Since every open-loop 
Nash equilibrium solution is also a Nash equilibrium solution under the closed- 
loop no-memory information structure, the Nash equilibrium solution to this 
class of problems cannot be unique, and in fact it exhibits "informational non- 
uniqueness" [see, Ba$ar and Olsder (1982)]. One way of eliminating this infor­
mational nonuniqueness under the feedback information pattern is to require 
the Nash equilibrium solution to have the additional property that its restric­
tion to the interval [n,N] is a Nash solution to the truncated version of the 
original problem, defined on [n,N], and this being so for all n € N. Such a 
solution is known as a feedback Nash equilibrium solution, which is free of 
any informational nonuniqueness, and whose derivation follows a dynamic pro­
gramming type argument, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. For the multicriteria decision problem described by (3.1)
and (3.2), and under the closed-loop no-memory (or closed-loop) information
*
pattern, the set of strategies [v” (xn)i n € N, m 6 5) provides a feedback 
Nash equilibrium solution if, and only if, there exist functions Vm (x),
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n € N, m € M, such that the following recursive relations are satisfied:
.jn, v . r m N 1 . x m-1* * mv (x) = m m  [g [f (x,u ), Y (x),..,y (x),u ,n _ _ n n n n n n
Um 6 if* n n
Y®fl(x),..,y^(x),x] + Vm [fm (x,uM )]} n n irH n n <*
“ Cx»y” (x))>Ŷ  (x).--.Yn (x)>xl + Vn+l[ïn (x>Yn (x))l
V^+1(X ) = °» m G M
where
*  *  *  j-
fm (x,u“) A f [XjY^Cx ), .. ,Ym 1(x),um ,Ym+I’(x),.. ,yM (x )] n v * n = n n n n n n
~ *  .m m, □
It should be clear from the above that feedback Nash equilibrium solu­
tion can be obtained recursively, by solving a set of static Nash problems at 
each stage, which is a feature that makes it computationally attractive. Yet 
another important feature that should be recorded is that feedback Nash solution 
is indeed a Nash equilibrium solution under the closed-loop no-memory or closed- 
loop information patterns (satisfying inequalities (2.6)), but one of many "in­
formationally nonunique" equilibria under those dynamic information structures.
As already mentioned above, when we have the closed-loop information 
pattern, or any dynamic information pattern that exhibits redundancy in informa­
tion, Nash equilibria are informationally nonunique and there exists in fact 
an uncountable number of such equilibria. A set of reasons for this is now 
provided in the following definition and proposition, where a proof for the 
latter can be found in (Ba^ar and Olsder (1982), chapter 6).
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Definition 3.2. Let A and B be two M-person N-stage deterministic multicri­
teria decision problems which admit precisely the same extensive form descrip­
tion (as in §2.2) except the underlying information pattern (and, of course, 
also the strategy spaces whose descriptions depend on the information pattern). 
Let (respectively, T|m) denote the information pattern of DMm in problem A 
(respectively, B) , and let the inclusion relation TJ™ c  T|™ imply that whatever 
DMm knows at each stage of A he also knows at the corresponding stages of B, 
but not necessarily vice versa. Then, A is informationally inferior to B if 
TJ™ c  T]̂  ? m € M, with strict inclusion for at least one m. □
Proposition 3.3. Let A and B be two deterministic decision problems as intro­
duced in Definition 3.2, so that A is informationally inferior to B. Further­
more, let the strategy spaces of the decision makers in the two problems be com­
patible with the given information patterns and constraints (if any) imposed 
on the controls, so that c  7]™ implies n™ c  m € M. Then, (i) any Nash 
equilibrium solution for A is also a Nash equilibrium solution for B, (ii) if 
is a Nash equilibrium solution for B such that tt € n™ for all 
m € M, it is also a Nash equilibrium solution for A. □
Hence, multicriteria deterministic decision problems with dynamic 
information patterns that exhibit redundancy in information are not well de­
fined under the Nash solution concept (since they admit a plethora of informa­
tionally nonunique equilibria) unless some additional selection criteria are 
introduced --such as the requirements imposed by the feedback Nash solution 
discussed earlier. We do not pursue this point any further here, but note 
that one such criterion is in fact provided in §4.3 under a stochastic set-up.
22
3.4. Stackelberg (Leader-Follower) Solutions
In this subsection, we treat the problem of optimal control and 
coordination of deterministic systems under a hierarchical decision structure, 
and investigate derivation of optimal control and coordination strategies by 
employing the Stackelberg solution concept introduced in §2.3. As discussed 
earlier in §2.3, while introducing the Stackelberg solution concept, existence 
of a hierarchy in decision making results in an asymmetry in the roles of the 
agents, with some of them being in a position to dictate their strategies on 
the others.
In general, derivation of Stackelberg solutions in dynamic decision 
problems is quite challenging, the difficulty being mostly of conceptual nature. 
However, for some special information structures, the problem becomes tractable 
because some standard methods and techniques of optimization and optimal con­
trol theory become applicable. One such class of problems is characterized by 
open-loop information structure, and say two agents (i.e. M = 2) for the sake 
of simplicity in the discussion to follow. Since the leader's information 
structure is open-loop, the optimization problem faced by the follower in the 
determination of his optimal response set (2.8) is structurally independent of 
different choices of strategies by the leader, and therefore the first phase 
of the derivation of the Stackelberg solution is a feasible (tractable) optimal 
control problem. In particular, if the follower's cost functional is strictly 
convex in his control, the rational response set Rin1) will be a singleton and 
the reaction function T [see (2.9a)] will be determined completely by a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions which, under certain structural assumptions 
2 -on f and g , n € N, will lead to an analytical solution for T. If such an n n
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analytic solution can be found, then the leader's optimization problem 
min j \ tt\ ttt )̂ is again a standard optimal control problem which can readily 
be solved using the available techniques for dynamic optimization, and the 
open-loop representation of this solution (in case it is obtained as closed- 
loop solution) will constitute a Stackelberg strategy for the leader. In case 
an analytic expression for T does not exist, the necessary and sufficient con­
ditions that describe T will have to be treated as constraints in the leader's 
optimization problem which again involves no difficulties of conceptual nature. 
A set of equations from which the solution of this constrained optimal control 
problem can be obtained can be found in (Ba$ar and Olsder (1982), chapter 7); 
we do not discuss this class of problems any further here. It is worth noting 
here that the preceding derivation is valid not only under the open-loop infor­
mation structure for both agents, but also when the follower has access to 
dynamic state information --the only requirement is that the leader should have 
only open-loop information. Furthermore, one can envisage direct extensions 
of this procedure to M-agent problems with one leader and M-l followers, with 
the latter determining their policies according to the Nash or Pareto-optimum 
solution conept, and with the leader having access to only open-loop informa­
tion; there appears to be no difficulties of conceptual nature in such an ex­
tension.
When the leader has access to dynamic state information, derivation 
of the Stackelberg solution constitutes a challenging problem, and the stan­
dard techniques of optimization do not apply, since the optimal control pro­
blem characterizing the rational response set R(tt̂ ) is now structurally de­
pendent on the leader's choice of strategies. One way out of this difficulty
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would be to fix the structure of the leader's possible strategies parametri­
cally, find the follower's rational response as a function of these parameters 
and then optimize the leader's cost functional over these parameter values, 
also in view of the follower's response; this definitely leads to suboptimal 
strategies for the leader --the degree of suboptimality depending on how 
representative the fixed structure is in the general class of policies.
Another way of making the Stackelberg problem tractable is to re­
quire the solution have a feedback property (under the closed-loop no-memory 
of closed-loop information sharing pattern), analogous to the case of the feed­
back Nash equilibrium solution, which would lead to a recursive derivation in 
retrograde time that involves solution of static Stackelberg problems at every 
stage. The solution obtained through such a recursive procedure is called a 
feedback Stackelberg solution [cf. Simaan and Cruz (1973a,b)] and satisfies 
the conditions given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. For the two-agent multicriteria decision problem described by 
(3.1) and (3.2) with M = 2, and under the closed-loop no-memory (or closed-loop)
1* 2 *information structure, the set of strategies {yn (x^),y (x ) » n € N } provides 
a feedback Stackelberg solution with DM 1 as leader, if
m m
1 c „1 2 . 1.y € T ,y € R (y )ln n 'n nv'n
-1/ 1 2 
c (y >y„>x )n 'n n n
~1 i* 2*
Gn (Yn ’Yn > f°r a U  xn € x > n ^ N>
where R^(y^) *-s a singleton set defined by
R (Y1) = [P2 ^ r2 : G2 (y1,32,x ) = min G2(y1,y2,x )}, Tr> n n n Tn n ’ nn ’n n 'n 'n n'
Yn
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Gm (v1»Y2»x ) A Gm [f (x ,y ^(x ),y 2(x ))jY1(x )»y2(x )»x )» n 'n Tn n = n L n n Tn n Tn n Tn n ' Tn n ' n
m =* 1,2, n € N ,
mand G^ is defined recursively by
m.
Y1(x )»Y2(x  )>x  ]n n+I, n n 'n n n Gn+l[£n+l(Xn+l’W K + l )^ + 1(xn+l))
m
1  2 *  m m
Yn+l(Xn+l),Yn+l(Xn+l),Xn+li + §n ; GN+1 = °> m = 1»2* D
The feedback Stackelberg solution corresponds to the case when the 
leader can enforce his strategy on the follower only stagewise; however, if 
he has the power and ability to declare and enforce his strategy several stages 
in advance throughout the decision process, or from the very beginning for the 
entire duration of the decision process, the cost that the leader incurs will 
definitely be less (or at least not higher) than his optimal cost under the 
feedback Stackelberg solution. In other words, in contrast to the feature re­
corded after Proposition 3.2 in the case of feedback Nash solution, the feed­
back Stackelberg solution is not necessarily a Stackelberg solution, i.e. it 
need not satisfy (2.9b); conversely, a Stackelberg solution obtained under the 
closed-loop no-memory information structure is not necessarily a feedback 
Stackelberg solution. On the other hand, derivation of a Stackelberg solution 
under dynamic state equation is a relatively much more difficult problem, for 
which the standard techniques of optimization cannot be used.
Another case treated in the literature recently is the closed-loop
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no-memory information structure where the leader's strategy is a function of 
the current state. This problem leads to a nonclassical control problem 
where the partial derivative of the leader's strategy with respect to the 
state appears. It is shown in Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1979a) that the 
optimal values of the state, controls, and objective functions are not changed 
by using controls which are more general than affine functions of the state. 
When the measurement is a function of the state (possibly nonlinear) the 
strategy may be assumed to be affine in the measurement without loss of gen­
erality.
Quite recently, an indirect approach has been developed towards the 
solution of such nonclassical optimization-decision problems when the leader 
has access to redundant information (such as the closed loop state informa­
tion). In the sequel we discuss some aspects of this new approach and deriva­
tion of the dynamic Stackelberg solution.
Now, for the general two-agent decision problem of this subsection, 
and with the leader having access to closed-loop state information, consider 
the following sequence of optimization problems.
STEP 1. For a fixed set of state vectors fx , n 6 N, n ^ 1} say fx = x , ------  c n J J c n n
n € N, n i  l], and leader's control vectors [u^, n € N}, minimize
N-l
^ (xn+ i - V  V V  + EA (V i ' V V V  + so(V ur ui’xi> (3<7)n=2
2 2 —over u € U , n € N, and subject to the constraint n n ’ J
xN+l V V V V
-  1 2x - — f (x ,u ,u ), n < N-l, xn = x . n+l n n ’ n n - 1 1
(3.8)
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Denote the solution of this problem by
Un = Zn(i2*,,’V Ul’" ' V ’ n € N ' (3.9)
STEP 2: Now consider minimization of the function
N-1
V ’W V V V  + V * n + l ’V V * n >  + 8S<52>"Î-"Î**1> (3-10>n=z
1 1 — - — over the leader's controls (u £ U , n £ N}, and the state values fx , n £ N,L n n c n* *
1*
n £ 1], subject to (3.8) and (3.9). Denote the minimizing solution by {u ,
n € n } and [x^, n £ N, n ^ 1} and the corresponding value of expression (3.10) 
1*by J
1 *The quantity J , thus obtained, provides, under a fairly general
1 i* i*
set of conditions, a tight lower bound on the Stackelberg cost J (tt ,Ttt )
of the leader (as defined by 2.9b)). These conditions basically involve exis-
1* i *tence of a strategy tt € II , for the leader, which is
1* -
(i) a closed-loop representation of the open-loop policy {u ,n £ N]
_ 1* *on the trajectory fx = x", n £ n }, where u and x are as defined above,n n J n n y
with x* = x^;
2  &(ii) forces the minimum value of (3.7) to be attained at fu = z (x„,,u * c n n x 2’
* 1 l — ,
..,xN ;u^ ’••UN )> n £ Nj, with the minimization problem defined by replacing 
1 *un in (3.7) and (3.8) by y* (.), n £ N, and x^, n £ N, in (3.8) by x , and 
retaining this new form of (3.8) as a constraint. Note that this latter re­
quirement is equivalent to the statement that the follower's rational response
*
to the leader's announced strategy rr̂  should lead to the trajectory [x*,
_ 2 i* , *
n £ n } and have the open-loop representation {u^ = z (x*,..,x^;u^ ,..,u^ ),
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n € n }.
Several recent papers have investigated, in special contexts, sat­
isfiability of these two conditions, and derivation of corresponding strategies 
1*(tt ) for the leader. Ba$ar and Selbuz (1979a,b) have shown that when the
system equation is linear and cost functionals are quadratic, there are cases
1* 1 when J coincides with the global minimum value of J (in particular, if the
follower does not act in the last stage of the game) and a corresponding Stackel- 
berg strategy for the leader is of the linear, one-step memory type. Tolwinski 
(1981) has shown that for the same class of problems, use of nonlinear strat­
egies by the leader extends the parameter region for which the preceding pro­
perties of the solution hold true. Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1980), Ba^ar 
and Olsder (1980) and Ba$ar (1981d) have investigated counterparts of these 
results and their extensions in the continuous time. Ho, Luh and Muralidharan 
(1980), Ho, Luh and Olsder (1980), and Salman and Cruz (1981) have drawn 
parallels between these results and incentive scheme design problems in eco­
nomics and have discussed applications of these concepts to microeconomics and 
social choice theory. Ba$ar (1981e) and Tolwinski (1980) have discussed pos­
sible extensions to multi-agent cases when there exist more than two levels of 
hierarchy and several agents at every level of decision making.Ba^ar and Selbuz 
(1979b) show that if there exist two levels of hierarchy and more than one 
agent in the follower's group, the leader can still retain his powerful posi­
tion by announcing an appropriate linear one-step memory strategy (for linear- 
quadratic problems) that would force the followers (who are making their deci­
sions noncooperatively and under the Nash solution concept) to minimize glob­
ally the leader's cost function. Ba^ar (1980b) has further discussed coordina­
tion aspects of such problems and has investigated the possibilities for the
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leader to coordinate the followers in such a way that the resulting solution 
will be Pareto-optimum, even though the followers may be acting noncoopera­
tive ly.
It is possible to extend the two-step derivation of the closed-loop 
Stackelberg solution, outlined earlier and defined through the optimization 
problems (3.7) - (3.10), to the case when the leader's information is partial 
closed-loop [see (3.5)]. In this case the two optimization problems at Steps 
1 and 2 will be replaced, respectively, by the following:
STEP 1*: Let the observation vector y*, defined by (3.5b), belong to the
space Y^. For a fixed set of observation vectors [y^ G Y^, n € N, n ^ l],say 
{y^ * yn , n G N, n ^ l}, and leader's control vectors [u^, n G N}, minimize
N 2 1 2  
S gn (Xn-t-1 ’Un ’Un ’Xn)_  +    n=0
(3.11)
2 2 —o v e r  u  G U  ,  n G N ,  a n d  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  n  n  J
, , 1 2X x = f (x ,u ,u ) n+1 n v n n n' (3.12a)
h (x ) * y , n G N, n ^ 1. n n n ’ (3.12b)
Denote the solution of this optimization problem by
Un ’ (3.13)
STEP 2 : Now minimize the function
S i ,  1 2 ,
S,Sn (xn+l'Un ’Un > Vn = l
(3.14)
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over the leader’s controls (u^ G u \  n € N], and the measurement valuesL n n
{y^ G Y^, n G N, n ^ l], subject to (3.12a), (3.13) and
1 1  -
yn = hn^Xn^ » n € N > n + l -
1* - -Denote the minimizing solution by {u^, n € n ] and {y*, n € N, n ^ l], the
“*C - ■
resulting state trajectory by {x , n G N} and the corresponding values of
1*expression (3.14) by J
1*The conditions for J to provide a tight lower bound on the Stackel- 
, * * ■ * 
berg cost J (tt1 , Trr ) involve, in this case, existence of a strategy tt*- G I F
[n1 is defined here as the class of all mappings compatible with the informa­
tion structure T]̂  given by (3.5a)] that satisfy condition (i) in the perfect 
information case and, in addition
( i i ! )  forces the minimum value of (3.11) to be attained at [u^ = z n (Y 2 > 
* 1* 1* -..,y ; u 1 ,..,u^ ), n G N } with the minimization problem defined by replacing
N 1 ” * _  ̂
u1 in (3.11) and (3.12a) by y (.), n G N, by replacing y in (3.12b) by y , n n n n
and by retaining these new forms of (3.12a)-(3.12b) as constraints.
For further details on the satisfiability of these two conditions 
and derivation of dynamic Stackelberg solution under partial state informa­
tion, we refer to Ba^ar (1980c) and Zheng and Ba^ar (1981); the latter re­
ference also investigates existence and derivation of affine Stackelberg 
strategies in such problems.
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4. COORDINATION AND CONTROL IN STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS
In this section we discuss coordination and control problems in the 
context of stochastic systems and under both deterministic and stochastic in­
formation patterns. We first delineate (in §4.1) several different informa­
tion structures that we shall encounter in our analysis, and then discuss (in 
§ 4.2) derivation and properties of optimal solutions in stochastic team pro­
blems. Subsequently in §4.3 we discuss Nash equilibria and in §4.4 the Stackel 
berg solution, for stochastic systems and under different information patterns
4.1. Information Structures in Stochastic Systems
In stochastic systems we encounter two general classes of information 
patterns, viz. deterministic and stochastic patterns:
a) Deterministic information structures
We have discussed these thoroughly in §4.1 in the context of deter­
ministic systems. The same patterns, namely, closed-loop perfect state, feed­
back, one-step (k-step) delay perfect state, and partial closed-loop informa­
tion structures, are appropriate also in stochastic systems, whenever the 
agents have access to the value of the initial state and to some deterministic 
information on the current and/or past values of the state.
b) Stochastic information structures
Assume that each agent has access to noisy measurement on the current 
value of the state through a measurement equation of the type (2.2), and that 
agents are also in a position to exchange some of their information (with or 
without delay). In such a case we have basically three general types of in­
formation structures as described below:
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i) Centralized information pattern; All agents exchange their 
measurements without any delay, and also recall their past information, i.e,
Tl™ = iy. yn ! > • • , y,}, m € m , n € nn n n-i i (4.1)
where
a  /  1  2yk i (yk > yk> •
M• , yk) > k ^ n .
This is also known as a classical information pattern, and it could also in­
volve the past control laws, i.e.
,m
in iyn ’yn-1 ’ Ï 5 V r Un-2 . ,u^],m 6 M, n € N (4.2)
where
a  /  1  2
uk â (uk> v
The two information structures (4.1) and (4.2) are not equivalent (even though 
they generate the same sigma-field for each fixed set of control laws), but 
only in team problems may they be used interchangeably without affecting the 
minimum value of the common objective functional — a point which will be 
further discussed in §4.2.
ii) Quasi-classical information patterns; In this group we have 
the "one-step delay observation (measurement) sharing pattern", in which case
yn-1’ y^}> m e M, n 6 N, (4.3a)
and the "one-step delay information sharing pattern" with
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^  = iyn’yn-l’ • • >yl; V l ’Un-2’ • • ’Ul}> ,{l,’ n £ B ' (4'3b)
In the former case all measurements are shared with a delay of one stage, 
while in the latter case also the past control values are shared. Our earlier 
comments regarding the equivalence of (4.1) and (4.2) are equally valid here 
in the context of (4.3a) and (4.3b); more discussion on this issue will be 
included in § 4.2.
A more general type of a quasi-classical information structure is 
the so-called partially nested information structure which we introduce next. 
Towards this end, assume that the joint probability distribution of the random 
variables associated with the stochastic system (2.1) and the measurement 
system (2.2) is independent of the values of the state and the controls. Then, 
by iterative substitution, (2.1) can be written as
n+1 f (x ,u ,0 ) n n n n'
n-1f [f -, (x . ,u -,0 -,),u ,0 ] A f (x 1 ;u ,u -,;9 ,9 -i)n L n-1 n-1 n-1 n-17* n* nJ = n n-1 n n-1 n n-1'
f (x.;u ,u i > • • > ® i » • • » ®-I ) »n 1 n n-1 1 n n-i i (4.4a)
and thus the state at any stage can be expressed solely in terms of the past 
controls, the past noise vectors and the initial state. In terms of this 
notation, the measurement equation (2.2) can be written as
m ^ hm [f^ - (x.. ; u ,u -,.. ,u, ; 0 »..»Q-,),©111];n nL n-lv 1* n n-1 * 1 n 1 nJ
A Hm (x1; u ,..,u.; 0 ,..,0.; 0m ); - nv 1 n 1 n 1 ny
(4.4b)
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that is, in this new form it depends only on the "primitive" random variables 
and the control vectors. Now, we call an information structure (pmC{y\.n- 'n’ ,yn ’
1 M 1 M
yn-l’**,yn-l;*“ ; un_^,..,u^>, n e N » m e M partially nested if
whenever p depends on u^ for some k _< n and i £ M [either directly or through n R
a measurement equation in the form (4.4)], the inclusion relation pm 3 p,1n —  k
tholds — this being so for every such dependence. In other words, if an infor­
mation structure is partially nested, an agent's information at a particular 
stage n can depend on the control of some other agent at some stage k < n 
only if he also has access to the information available to that agent at that 
stage k.
The one-step-delay observation sharing pattern and the one-step 
delay information sharing pattern introduced earlier are special types of 
partially nested information patterns. The reason why we are interested in 
partially nested information patterns is that stochastic optimization and in 
particular team problems with such information patterns are considerably more 
tractable than those with nonclassical information patterns — this latter con­
cept to be defined in the sequel.
iii) Nonclassical information patterns. An information pattern is 
said to be nonclassical if it is not partially nested. Equivalently, if {nm , 
n G N, m £ M) is nonclassical, there exists some set of indices {n, ke N, 
m, i G  M, n ^ k }  such that depends on u^ but P™ A
T h i s  i n c l u s i o n  r e l a t i o n  c a n  b e  r e p l a c e d  b y  t h e  s o m e w h a t m o re  g e n e r a l  r e q u i r e ­
m e n t t h a t  " t h e  e le m e n t s  o f  p i  c a n  b e  r e c o v e r e d  b y  m e a s u r a b le  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  
o n  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  p ™ " .
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4.2. Solutions of Stochastic Team Problems
Under the centralized stochastic or deterministic information pat­
terns, stochastic team problems become equivalent to stochastic control pro­
blems, and therefore the solution techniques developed for this latter class 
of problems [see e.g. Bertsekas (1976)] are directly applicable to team pro­
blems. In this context, it is immaterial whether the agents also have access 
to values of past controls, since there is a single goal and a single objec­
tive functional to minimize. In other words, the minimum value of a team 
cost functional J will be the same regardless of whether it is computed under 
(4.1) or (4.2); in that sense we call the two information structures equiva­
lent as far as the optimal team solution is concerned. However, this 
feature is no longer valid in multi-criteria problems (under Nash or Stackel- 
berg solution concepts).
If the underlying information structure is not centralized, the 
derivation of the optimal team solution is in general quite intractable. For 
some special types of stochastic team problems and under the partially nested 
information pattern, however, the derivation becomes tractable by conversion 
into an equivalent static formulation. Before discussing this conversion, we 
first state a related result [Proposition 4.1] on an important property of 
partially nested information patterns in stochastic team problems:
_ , m r 1 ,M 1 - MLet {nn £ {yn>-*>yn; y_ ■.»••»y 1 M ,n-1* ’  * ,jrn-l* * * * 5 y l ’ ” , y l ;  U n - l ’ * * ’ V  ’
n N, m G M} be a partially nested information pattern, with the correspond­
ing strategy spaces denoted by {if1, m €= M} and the corresponding sub-strategy
spaces by {rm , n G N, m G M). Let rj™ denote, for each n G N, m G Ms the inter-
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. . r: r̂.  . . . m ,  1 M l  M 1 M
s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n i t e  s e t s  a n d  { y n > - - > y n ;  ^ n - l ’ * * »y n - l ; * * * ;  y l , , , , y l ^  *
Note that {q^, n g  N, m g  M} is also a partially nested information struc­
ture, which does not involve any explicit dependence on past control vectors 
[whereas q™ may explicitly depend on controls]. Denote the corresponding
Am —  *m —strategy spaces by {rj- , m g  M } and the sub-strategy spaces by {rn > n G N,
— 1 2  m g  M} .  Consider a stochastic team problem with cost functional 1 ( 7 7  , 77
M M
77 ) to be jointly minimized [over ^X^lf1] by all agents. Then, we have the 
following important result.
Proposition 4.1.
/.\rr> , , m m  mN 4 m m —(1) To every fixed M-tuple (y^, A tt G II , m G M,
there corresponds a unique set of strategies {im _ (yJ.y“V• • . » £
such that the sigma-field generated by nm with um = ym (nm), n G  N, m G  M, isn n n n
equivalent to the sigma-field generated by fim with um = ^ ( q 111) , n G  N, m G  M.---------  n n n nM
(ii) J admits a global minimum over X if1, if and only if it admits 
M
a global minimum over X_ u , and the minimum values of J in both cases arem=l
the same. □
This proposition is a consequence of the observation that, under 
the partially nested information structure, any direct information concerning 
the value of control is redundant since it can be recovered from the measure­
ment information once the control law is known. Consequently, additional in­
formation concerning the values of past controls [provided that we still have 
a partially nested information structure] does not help to improve upon the 
globally optimal team solution. An implication of this property is that, 
given a specific partially nested information pattern for a stochastic team 
problem, we can construct an equivalent (larger or smaller) partially nested
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information structure that is equivalent to it, and reconsider the original 
team problem under this new information structure without affecting the opti­
mal value of the objective functional. What we gain in return for such a 
conversion is a possible simplification in the derivation of the optimal team 
solution. The team solution obtained under the new information structure can 
then be expressed in terms of the original information structure. Examples 
of such an indirect derivation of optimal solutions in stochastic team pro­
blems can be found in Ho and Chu (1972) and Bagchi and Ba^ar (1980), and 
they are primarily linear quadratic problems. A CAVEAT for the reader, at 
this point, is that neither Proposition 4.1 nor any of these conversion tech­
niques have counterparts in multi-criteria problems (under Nash or Stackelberg 
solution concept).
Let us now consider one special class of stochastic team problems 
in some detail. Assume that the information structure is partially nested, 
and that the measurement equations (4.4b) are separable in the control vari­
ables, i.e. (4.4b) can be written as
H™(x ; e . n i  n
m\
•91 S 0n) + G ^ u  n € N, m £ M.n n 1 (4.5)
Here, the function depends on the control vectors in a way that is consis­
tent with the underlying partially nested information structure (n™; n e N,
— , ~m . _ . _ i _ m » , , i .. . _ r m* _mm G M} ; i.e. is a function of u^ only if includes q^. Now, if {it e IT ,
m € M]denotes an optimal team solution for a stochastic team problem with such
a partially nested information structure, and with a cost functional J, where
J(ïï) = E{L(£ ,u\ .. ,uM) | um = rm (qm) , m e  M ,
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and £ denotes the collection of all primitive random variables, we have (from 
the definition of team optimality)
£ j(tt) , v 7Tm e nm, m G M,
which implies the NM-tuple of inequalities
J(tt*) < J(it
„ i « * *m-i m m m
• 5*rr .y , . .  ,y , y




v m m —  —Yn ^  r n ; n e  N, m g  M.
This set of inequalities (also known as person-by-person optimality, if we
view each u™ to be controlled by a different agent) therefore provides a n
necessary condition for tt to be a team-optimal solution. Note that here, 
all sub-strategies are held at their optimal values and the resulting cost
functional is minimized over possible strategies y™ E rm ; hence each minimi-n n
zation problem is basically of the form




m, mN _ , lrt, 1N m " , mN m m M*, M.n
Ln (?  *un ) A (n ) ; . . ; y 1 ( t̂ )  » • *un > * * >YN ; • • (n ) )
and Pm (Hnm) is the conditional probability distribution of the primitive n  ̂1 ‘n
random variables ç given the information vector ri™. This conditional pro­
bability distribution is also known as the sufficient statistics for DM m 
at stage n. E{.} denotes the expected value over the statistics of n™, after
= ym (nm) is determined. The reason why Lm can be determined explicitly 1 n 'n n
mun
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as a function of (r,um) is because the information structure is causal, andn
hence elimination of other variables by iterative substitution is possible.
Whenever Tf1 is partially nested and the measurements that appear n
in tT satisfy the separability condition (4.5), the sufficient statistics 
have a simpler form which is basically static in nature. To see this, 
firstly construct (in view of Proposition 4.1) the largest partially nested 
information structure (say, T^) that is equivalent to T]̂ . This new informa­
tion structure Tp clearly has the property that whenever T|̂  C ^  for any 
k £  n, i G M, we have u^ G T^. Because of separability of (4.5) and the 
partially nested property of T|̂ , we have the further (sigma-field)equiva-
lence
if s ifn n
where Tjm is obtained from T|m by replacing all yj with ri U K .
\  = V * l ; V " ’01! V
Therefore,
P(5|H”> = P(5|l“) = P(c|ri“) •
But, since is also partially nested, the presence of the control values in 1 n
does not provide any additional information, and we may as well consider 
the smaller set
/v m ^ m  . 1  M 





which is totally static. Hence,
which implies that there exists an equivalent static sufficient statistics 
for DM m at stage n. This leads to the following important conclusion. 
Proposition 4.2.
(i) Any stochastic team problem with dynamic partially nested 
information structure (7)̂ , n 6 N, m G M } , whose measurement equations also 
satisfy the property (4.5), is equivalent to one with a static information 
structure {T^j n G N, m G M } as constructed above, in the sense that the 
optimal solution of one can be obtained from the optimal solution of the other.
(ii) If (u^ = (j^) ; n G N, m G M } denotes the optimal team
solution under the equivalent static information structure, the solution of
m* m* m* —  —the original team problem can be expressed as {u^ = (TJ ); n e N, m £ M}
where is obtained from by replacing "ŷ  with
i ~i/ 1 M x 
yk ” Gk (u ,“ ,U ^
and by appropriately replacing some of the controls with their optimum values, 
in a way compatible with the underlying information structure. [if the orig­
inal information structure ™ is the largest partially nested information 
structure that is equivalent to itself, this latter phase is not required]. □ 
Remark. The separability condition (4.5) of the Proposition can be relaxed 
to some extent. The real requirement here is that the conditional probability
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P (H m) should be independent of the control laws, so that there can be found n
. I mN . I a  mN ,a static information structure with the property P(U ) = P(t, ). An n n
more relaxed condition [than (4.5)] that achieves this is given in Ho and 
Chu (1973). □
The result of Proposition 4.2 is very useful in stochastic team pro­
blems, because derivation of the optimal team solution under static informa­
tion is in general much simpler than the derivation under dynamic information. 
In particular, for the special case when (i) the measurement equations are 
linear in the primitive random variables and the controls, (ii) the primitive 
random variables are jointly Gaussian distributed, (iii) the cost functional 
L is quadratic in the control vectors and the primitive random variables, and 
(iv) L is further strictly convex in the control variables, the unique team 
optimal solution is affine in the available information and can readily be 
computed by solving the set of minimization problems (4.6) [see Radner (1962), 
Ho and Chu (1972)]. Therefore, every linear-quadratic-Gaussian stochastic 
team problem with strictly convex cost functional and partially nested infor­
mation structure admits a team-optimal solution that is affine in the avail­
able information — a result which directly follows from Radner’s above men­
tioned result in view of Proposition 4.2. Furthermore, team-optimal control 
laws can be obtained recursively when the partially nested information pat­
tern is one-step delay information sharing [Kurtaran (1975), Sandell and 
Athans (1974), Yoshikawa (1975)] or one-step-delay observation sharing [Baçar 
(1978a)], The solution is unique in the latter case and nonunique in the 
former case — the nonuniqueness arises because the one-step delay information 
sharing pattern includes redundant information which gives rise to several
42
different "representations" [see, Basar (1978a)].
If the underlying information structure in a stochastic team problem 
is nonclassical, derivation of the optimal team solution meets with formidable 
difficulties. Even in the simplest type of a linear-quadratic-Gaussian team 
problem with a two-step delay information sharing pattern (i.e. a nonclassical 
information pattern) the optimal solution is nonlinear and cannot be obtained 
analytically; moreover even a numerical derivation is a challenging task be­
cause such problems admit several person-by-person optimal solutions and local 
optima [see, Witsenhausen (1968)]. There are also no simple sufficient sta­
tistics for such problems with nonclassical information patterns [see,Yoshikawa 
and Kobayashi (1978), and Varaiya and Walrand (1978)]. These difficulties are 
due to the fact that each control has in general a "triple" role in stochastic 
team problems [Ho (1980)] : (i) the deterministic control effort of reducing
the error, (ii) to improve the future knowledge of uncertainty, (iii) to 
"signal" the agents acting in the future some useful information which they 
will not necessarily acquire [in the case of classical or quasi-classical in­
formation patterns, this third role is absent]; and these three roles are in 
general in conflict with each other. Only if these roles are isolated, the 
stochastic team problems with nonclassical information patterns tend to be
comparatively tractable [see, Witsenhausen (1975), and Ho, Kastner and Wong 
(1978)] — but this is indeed a very special class of problems and the more 
general nonclassical stochastic team problems await innovative ideas, tech­
niques and approaches.
4.3 Nash Equilibria
Derivation of Nash equilibria for stochastic systems controlled by
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several agents with different objective functionals is, in general, an ex­
tremely challenging problem when the information pattern is nonclassical 
--the reasons being similar to those we have discussed above at some length 
in the context of team problems. Therefore, we will confine our discussion 
in the sequel to deterministic, and stochastic classical and quasi-classical 
information patterns.
We have seen in §3.3 that in the case of deterministic systems with 
deterministic dynamic information patterns, there exists, in general, a multi­
tude of Nash equilibria --the reason being that in such problems (i) every con­
trol law has several different "representations" and (ii) every Nash equilibrium 
obtained under an information structure that is inferior to the original deter­
ministic information structure constitutes a Nash solution also under the 
original information structure. We call such equilibria "informationally non­
unique" Nash solutions. For stochastic systems of the type (2.1), however, in­
formationally nonunique Nash equilibria cannot occur, even under deterministic 
dynamic state information, provided that (roughly speaking) the noise vector 
0n "influences" all points in the state space X, and for every n € N [Ba§ar 
(1976, 1979a)]. A more precise statement can be given for the case when 0^ has 
an additive effect, that is when (2.1) is written as
xn+1 ■ f (x , u * ..,u*S + 0 .n n n n' (5.7)
The requirement here is that the probability measure ^  associated with 0^ 
should assign positive probability to every open subset of X [assuming that 
an appropriate topology is defined on X] [Van Damme(1980)]. Such a stochastic 
formulation ensures existence of a unique representation for every strategy and
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hence eliminates the possibility of having informationally nonunique Nash 
equilibria under dynamic state information (such as the closed-loop perfect 
state information). The only nonuniqueness (if any) will be due to the struc­
tures of the cost functions and the state equation.
Consider now the case when the system equation is given by (4.7)[with 
the probability measure of 9^ having the property discussed above], the under­
lying information structure is closed-loop perfect state, and the cost func­
tional of DM m (m ^ M) is given by
N
Tm _ r T 1 M .r = Et L g (x ,u ,..,u,x) n-1 n n+1 n n n
m m , m> —” _ — i
u = Y (n ) ,  n G n  m e  MJ- . 
n n n
For such problems the Nash equilibrium solution can be computed recursively, 
by following a dynamic programming type argument and by solving at each stage
ma static Nash problem. Assuming that each f (.) and g (n E  N, m E M) isn n
continuously differentiable in its arguments, and {9 , n £ N h s  an indepen-n
•k
dent sequence, the recursive relation that yields the Nash solution { u . n*
Ym (x ); n G N, m G M } reads [c.f. Baçar (1979a)]:n n
»J* ^
f i  xj £ , 1 1 M x , n _m, * 1 M . , _J iV f (x , u , • • , u )v G (x , _ ,u ,..,u , x )+v G (x i ,u , . . ,u ,x )d£> = 0 x m n  n  n  n  o n  n+1 n  n  n  m n  n+1 n  n  n  n
X
,-jn 1 M * f _m , * 1 M
Gn^Xn + l ,Un* * * *Un ,Xn = j i V l ^ ’ V r ' - V l ’ V l ^ n + l
, m 1 M v+ g (x ,u ,..,u ,x ) n n+1 n n n
G™ = 0, m e M, n G N
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where
*X A f (x ,u1*..,uM*) + en+1 = n n n n n
and 9  denotes the probability measure of 0 . It should be noted that "infor- n n
mational nonuniqueness" is absent here, mainly because of our assumption on 
^n G N)» and it: is for this reas°n that every solution set will be a func­
tion of only the current value of the state. When the state equation is lin­
ear and each cost functional is quadratic, a unique solution can be obtained 
under some invertability conditions on system matrices, and the Nash control 
laws are affine functions of the current values of the state (depending only
on the mean value of 0 ) [Basar (1979a)].n 7
When the underlying information structure is quasi-classical, deri­
vation of the Nash equilibrium solution is a more subtle issue. Firstly, 
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 do not have any counterparts here, which totally 
removes the possibility of simplifying the information structure (such as 
reconsidering the original problem under an "equivalent" static information). 
Secondly, if the underlying information pattern is the one-step delay infor­
mation sharing pattern, there exists, in general, a plethora of "informa­
tionally nonunique" Nash equilibria, because that particular information 
pattern incorporates redundancy in dynamic information [each agent having 
access to past measurements as well as to past control values of the other 
agents],[See Ba^ar (1978a) for a class of such informationally nonunique Nash 
equilibria.] In order to avoid informationally nonunique equilibria, we have 
to restrict our attention to those quasi-classical information patterns 
which are free of any redundancy in dynamic information — such as the one- 
step-delay observation sharing pattern.
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The derivation of Nash equilibria under the one-step-delay observa­
tion sharing pattern is not a totally intractable problem, and, depending on 
the structures of the cost functions, measurement equations and state equa­
tion, one can utilize a partially recursive procedure (of the dynamic pro­
gramming type) that would yield the optimal solution. This procedure (when­
ever it works) involves, at each stage, the solution of static stochastic Nash 
problems and satisfaction of some consistency conditions; however, as a 
caveat for the reader we should mention that such a derivation is not routine 
and it involves several pitfalls, mainly due to the fact that the conditional 
distribution of the state at each stage (given the past and present acquired 
information) depends in general on the past control laws [hence, the deriva­
tions at each stage cannot totally be isolated, as in the case of stochastic 
team problems discussed in §4.2].
Let us now outline this procedure in some general terms, by pointing 
out the difficulties as they arise. Suppose that the Nash equilibrium solu­
tion has been determined up to the last stage, and we are faced with the 
’’static" last stage Nash problem which has the cost function
imN
_ r m, _ , 1 M. , 1 M , i i
E *gN^fN^XN,UN’*‘,lV  0N,UN ’**’UN ’ *N̂  ' UN ~
yn (\ }’ 1 M }
for DM m, where the probability distribution of depends on the past controls 




% (yN ;yN-l;“ ;yl) m e m . (4.8)
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[Derivation of this solution will in general be quite difficult; however, the 
difficulty is not a conceptual one but rather a computational one. We will 
discuss this point further, in the sequel, for the special case of linear- 
quadratic problems.] Here, will depend on the conditional probability 
distribution of x^, and thereby on the past control laws. Now, if the struc­
tural dependence of on y™ depends explicitly on the past control laws, 
the procedure cannot be carried over to the next stage, since y™ also depends 
on G M } and therefore the general structure of the Nash problem at
stage N-l will depend (implicitly) on the solution that is being sought. This 
difficulty can, however, be avoided, if (4.8) happens to be separable in y™,
i.e.
.m, m
W v i ........ ^  =
^m, mx V (y ) N yW
„ m ,
+ V yN-L’- (4.9)
with the further property that is functionally independent of the past 
control laws. In such a case, the dependance of the Nash equilibrium strat­
egies at stage N on the controls at stage N-l [i.e. ( u™ m G M }] are 
completely determined by the functions (<p™, m G M )], and therefore we can
proceed to the next stage (N-l) for determination of the Nash control laws
*m




- u- = V V
m , m M, (4.10)
min the state equation and the cost functionals, where is any measurable
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function of its arguments. The "static" Nash problem (of interest) at stage 
N-l will then involve the cost functionals
Tm r m r  - , 1 M x Q 1 M ,
JN-1 E/'-8N-lffN-l(XN-l,UN-l,**,UN-l) + 0N-1,UN-1,**,UN-1,XN-1]
m _ . -1 -M. , r. _i -M , | i i „i
+ W V V - - - V  + V V ’- v V 1
-1 _
i € M } , m £ M,
_ m  .where u^ is given by (4.10), Xĵ  is related to the controls at stage N-l through
*N V l (xN-l,uK-l,,,,uN - P  + 9N-1:
mand is related to the past controls through
m m Qm 
yN “ V XN ,0n )'
Now suppose that, for a fixed set of sub-strategies at stages N-2,N-3,..,1, 
the solution of this Nash problem exists and is given by
m ,~m ^m , m . . ~m . _ —
YN-1^ TC-P * ^N-l^N-P + CpN-l^yN-2’ * * ,yP  * m ^ M > (4.11)
^mwhere cp̂   ̂ is functionally independent of the past control laws, but it may 
depend on [k^, i € M } which in turn depends on the value of y™  ̂at equilib­
rium through the second term in (4.9). Invoking the consistency condition, and 
re-solvmg for YN_^ from (4.11), we obtain the structural form
m _m *m m «m , . _ —
YN-1(\-1> “ '<k-l(yN-l) + 'fIN-l(yN-2’--’yl)’ m 6 M ’
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where cp̂   ̂does not depend on either the past controls or [k^, i € m }. Hence, 
we can now let
m _m *m m , . m . c —
UN-1 = UN-X " V l < W  + kU-X(yN-2’--’yl)> " € M >
where  ̂is any measurable function of its arguments, and repeat the deeds 
of stage N-l at stage N-2. Then, the solution can be obtained inductively by 
invoking the consistency requirement at every stage, under the assumptions 
that at every stage a Nash equilibrium solution to the related static problem 
exists, and it satisfies a separability condition of the type (4.9) or (4.11).
The above outlined procedure has been implemented in Ba^ar (1978b) 
for the class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) systems under the one-step- 
delay observation sharing pattern, and existence of a unique Nash solution, 
linear in the available information, has been verified under some sufficiency 
conditions that involve the system parameters. The "static" stochastic Nash 
problem to be solved at each stage is of the linear-quadratic type, whose solu­
tion is discussed in Ba^ar (1975) and Ba^ar (1978a), which may be considered 
as an extension of Radner's result [Radner (1962)] referred to in §4.2 to pro­
blems with different objectives for different agents. We should mention that 
the solution of the general LQG problem given in Ba^ar (1978b) is highly com­
plicated in terms of the equations which yield the coefficient matrices of 
the linear control laws, and it does not satisfy any separation property (as 
opposed to the solution of the LQG team problem under the same information 
pattern).
When the underlying information structure is nonclassical, derivation 
of the Nash equilibrium solution is in general not tractable, since even the
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special case of nonclassical team problems involve formidable difficulties, 
as discussed earlier in §4.2. However, there exists a subclass of problems 
with totally conflicting goals, whose Nash equilibrium solutions (rather 
called saddle-point solutions in this context) can be obtained explicitly 
(and analytically) even under nonclassical information patterns, mainly be­
cause in such problems controls of the agents do not have "triple'1 role (i.e. 
the signaling aspect is absent). For example, Witsenhausen's counter example 
[Witsenhausen (1968)], when c&st in such a framework, admits unique Nash 
(saddle-point) equilibrium that is linear in the available nonclassical in­
formation [see, Ba^ar and Mintz (1972)]. For more discussion on such solv­
able stochastic problems with nonclassical information patterns, see Ba^ar 
and Mintz (1971, 1973).
4.4. Hierarchical Decision Structure
In this subsection, we discuss the problem of optimal control and 
coordination of stochastic systems under hierarchical decision structure, by 
employing the Stackelberg solution concept introduced in §2.2 and elaborated 
on in §3.4 for deterministic systems. Let us first direct our attention to 
the case of two agents with different goals, and with DM 1 (called the leader) 
being in a position to enforce his strategy on DM2 (known as the follower).
Information structure again plays a crucial role in such problems, 
and solvability of a specific problem depends to a great extent on the nature 
of the underlying information pattern. We should mention, at the outset, that 
stochastic decision problems in which the leader has access to static or 
dynamic redundant information (such as the one-step delay information sharing 
pattern) are much more tractable as compared with those in which the leader
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has dynamic (non-redundant) information (such as the one-step delay observa­
tion sharing pattern) --this latter class of problems is in fact extremely 
challenging and as to date no general method exists that would aid in their 
solution.
Static information
When the leader has access to static information [more precisely,
if the leader's information does not depend on the controls of the follower],
the stochastic Stackelberg problem is tractable because the rational response
set of the follower does not structurally depend on the strategy of the leader.
Such problems are then essentially equivalent to one-stage stochastic Stackel-
tberg problems which we now discuss. In terms of the standard notation, let 
J™ = E [gH^u^u2,^! u1 - tt1^ 1), i = 1,2 } , m = 1,2,
where
I1 = ty1} > y1 = hx(5), i = 1,2 ,
and § denotes a collection of primitive random variables with known probability 
distributions. Let € II* be fixed, where is appropriately defined. Then, 
the follower is faced with the stochastic minimization problem
min E ig2[n1(h1(5)), TT2<y2) }
2 2 r €IT
= min E {g2[n1(h1(5)), u2,5]| y 2 }, 
u2
•f
When the follower has access to dynamic information, there is no loss of 
generality in replacing it with an appropriate static information.
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whose structure does not depend on the choice of tt since tt does not carry
2 2 2 u in its argument. If g is strictly convex in u , this minimization pro­
blem admits a unique solution [regardless of the choice of tt1] which we denote 
1 2  2 1by T: II -» II , so that tt = T tt uniquely solves (4.12). The Stackelberg 
1*strategy tt1- is then any solution of the stochastic minimization problem
min E {g1 [tt1 (y1) , Ttt1^ 1),^}
tt1 e n 1 (4.13)
= min E {g1[u1,Tu1, 5] ly1 } . 
u
The two optimization problems (4.12) and (4.13) can be solved (at least numer­
ically) without any major difficulty of conceptual or methodological nature,
and in a few cases the solution can be obtained analytically. One such specific
1 2  1case is the class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian systems [g and g quadratic, h 
2and h linear, and £ Gaussian], for which the Stackelberg solution is affine. 
More precisely, we have from Ba^ar (1979a, 1980a).
Proposition 4.3.
,1 .2Let § = (x,0 ,0 ) be Gaussian distributed with mean zero and covari- 
1 2ance diag(2, A , A ). Further let
m 1 2 .  1 m ’ m m' i 1 i* i m'g (x,u , u ) = - u D u + u D u + - u D ,u + u C x 2 mm mi 2 mJ mm
+ u C.x; m >i = M ;  i ^ m, D > 0, mi mm
and 1 A^\ TT® , A® 1 Ah (x,0 ) = H x + 0  , m = 1,2.
Then, the stochastic Stackelberg problem with static information
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if = [y }. m « 1,2, admits the unique solution
where A is the unique solution of the Lyapunov-type equation
and
D11A + D̂21D22D13D22D21 " D12D22D21 " D21D22DÎ2^ A E2H E1
[(D!2 " D21D22D13)D22C22 + D21D22C12^22H E1 “ C11Z1
A + A“)’1, m = 1,2,
provided that the condition




Remark. The preceding result may be considered as an extension of Radner*s 
result on LQG teams, cited in §4.2, to problems with different objective 
functionals for the agents and with a hierarchical decision structure. Even 
though this specific result pertains to the two-agent case, its extensions 
to the multi-agent case with more than two levels of hierarchy (in decision 
making) can be envisioned —  such problems (when cast in the LQG framework) 
also admit unique affine solutions, but the verification and the derivation 
are much more complicated than in the two-agent case [Ba^ar (1981c)]. Yet 
another extension (and application) of Proposition 4.3 would be to dynamic
54
decision problems under the feedback (stagewise) Stackelberg solution concept, 
in which case the leader enforces his strategy on the follower only stagewise. 
For LQG dynamic systems and under the one-step-delay observation sharing pat­
tern, it can be shown by repeated application of Proposition 4.3, together 
with a dynamic programming type argument, that the feedback Stackelberg solu­
tion is affine in the information available to the two agents [see, Baçar 
(1979)]. □
Dynamic redundant information
We have earlier discussed in §4.3 that presence of redundancy in the 
dynamic information structure gives rise to ill-posed problems in the case of 
Nash equilibria, because it leads to a plethora of informationally nonunique 
solutions. For problems with hierarchical decision structure, however, the 
situation is quite the opposite. This time, presence of redundancy in the 
dynamic information actually helps to simplify the derivation of the Stackel­
berg solution, because the extra freedom allotted to the leader through the 
redundancy enables him to provide incentives or implement threats for the 
follower, so as to force him to the most favorable solution [from the leader’s 
point of view]. We have already elucidated this property of redundant dynamic 
information in §3.4 for deterministic systems, and in the following we discuss 
it for stochastic systems within the context of a specific model.
Consider the general two-agent decision problem treated earlier in 
this subsection, but under the amended information structure
~1 r 1 2 2, _2 r 2-»8 [y,y >u 1, T1 = iy }»
that is, the leader has also access to the measurement and control value of
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the follower. [Of course, this makes sense only if the follower acts before 
the leader does, which we assume to be valid in this case]. Now let
min E [g1[§,Tr1(y1,y2), Tr2(y2)]}
Ti1 6 n 1,TT2 € n 2
exist and be determined uniquely by
u1 = tt1 (y^y2), u2 = tt2 (y2).
2 t 2t 1 1Let E [g (£,u , u  )} = g z  , and let there exist a fr1 € II1 such that
min E {g2[5,n1(y1,y2,u2),u2] | u2 = TT2(y2)} > g2 . 
Ti2 € n 2
Then, by announcing the strategy
*
tt1 on1) = <
U 2 2 / 2,if u = tt (y )
TT1 otherwise
2*~the leader can force the follower to adopt the strategy tt , and thereby incur
*
an overall favorable cost value. We can therefore declare as a Stackelberg 
strategy for the leader and consider the problem solved. However, for several
1*reasons, one may wish to replace the essential threat tt with a "softer" in­
centive scheme which penalizes the follower proportionately to his deviation 
from the desired solution. Such incentive schemes (which are basically dif- 
ferent representations of ti ) do exist, and for several discussions and 
derivations, as well as on extensions of this approach, we refer to Ba^ar
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(1980a), and also to Ho, Luh and Mulidharan (1981). Extensions to the case of 
multi-levels of hierarchy are discussed in Baçar (1981a).
Non-redundant dynamic information
For the procedure outlined above to work, the information structure
of the leader should be such that if, at stage n € N, 7]̂  depends on u^ for some
k < n [either directly or through the measurement equation], then he should
2 ?know both the value of u^ and the information Tç on which it is based. With 
such an information structure, which incorporates redundancy, the leader can, 
in general, enforce the solution that is most favorable to him. If the infor­
mation structure is dynamic, but does not incorporate any redundancy, the 
Stackelberg solution is extremely difficult to obtain, unless one parameterizes 
the desired solution and converts the original dynamic optimization problem to 
a static one (over those parameter values). Such an approach, of course, leads 
in general to suboptimal Stackelberg solutions. Even for linear-quadratic sto­
chastic systems with perfect state measurements, there is no known method to 
obtain the closed-loop Stackelberg solution, and the linear suboptimal solu­
tion can only be obtained numerically, with the coefficient matrices depending 
on the statistical parameters of the additive system noise [see, Baçar (1979a)].
The following table [Table 1] now recapitulates, in a nutshell, the 
known results and the yet-unsolved problems in the control and coordination 
of stochastic systems with multiple decision makers and under different types 
of information, together with related references. We have classified the pro­
blems in four categories.
(1) Completely solved ones — remaining details are of minor nature.
(2) Not completely solved. Any new result on this class of problems
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will constitute a contribution to the field, but a totally innovative approach 
is not required.
(3) Some "positive" and "negative" partial results on special cases 
exist; but this general class of problems is extremely challenging, and innova­
tive approaches have to be introduced in order to solve a sufficiently general 
class of such problems.
(4) These problems are ill-posed, mainly because they lead to a 
plethora of solutions which cannot be strictly ordered.
The references quoted in the Table are not meant to be exhaustive; we 





Team Saddle-point Nash Stackelberg
Closed-loop 
perfect state
LQG (1) Bertsekas (1976) (1) Ba$ar and Olsder (1982)
(1)Baçar and Olsder 
(1982)
(3) Cruz (1978)
other (2) (2) (2)
Stochastic
Centralized
LQG (1) Bertsekas (1976) (1) Ba^ar (1981b) (2) Ba^ar (1978b)
(3) Cruz (1978)












LQG (l)Sandell andAthans (1974), Ho (1980
(2) Ba?ar (1978b) (4)






(l)Ho and Chu (1972, 
1973), Ho (1980)




LQG (l)Ho and Chu (1972, 1973), Ho (1980)






(2) Ba^ar and Mintz 
(1971,1972,1973) (3) (3)
TABLE 1: A display of the current "state of Knowledge" on




In this section we consider a few simplified situations where the 
concepts of multiperson decision-making are meaningful. The examples are 
intended to suggest potential areas where the concepts may be used as guides 
in decision-making.
5.1. Nash Equilibrium Model of an Arms Race
Richardson's model [Richardson (I960)] of arms race between two
nations:
¿1(t) = ax^it) - ax^(t) + g (5.1)
¿2(t) = px^t) — yx2(t) + h (5.2)
has generated some interest in political science in further exploration of 
mathematical models in international relations. The arms levels (at time t) 
of two nations are represented by x^(t) and x2(t), a and p are called 
defense coefficients, a and y are called fatigue coefficients, and g and h 
are grievance coefficients. Discretizing time, the model may be represented 
in multistage form as
x^(k+l) = a12(k)x2(k) + a ^ ^ x ^ k )  + b^k) (5.3)
x2(k+l) = a21(k)x1(k) + a22(k)x2(k) + b2(k). (5.4)
In an attempt to model how the coefficients a_(k) might evolve and to 
attempt to explain how the nations' decision processes might lead to the 
model in (5.1) and (5.2), Simaan and Cruz [Simaan and Cruz (1975a)] proposed 
a Nash equilibrium model for the following multiperson decision problem:
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The fundamental model for the arms levels is given by the pair of equations:
x (k+1) = B ^ C k )  + Zx(k) (5.5)
x2(k+l) = 32x2(k) + Z2(k) (5.6)
where 3-jx1(k) and B2x2(k) are the depreciated values of the arms stocks at 
stage k+1, and Z^(k) and Z2(k) are investments in arms. We seek strategies 
which are feedback Nash equilibrium strategies with respect to some objective 
functions. Thus Z^(k) and Z2(k) will be functions of the current arms levels 
x^(k) and x2(k) • The objective functions are modeled to be
J.(Z1,Z2) = |  Q.(N+1)(x .(N+1) - Pi(N+l)xj(N+l) - Vi(N+l))2
1 N 2 + iy Z {R.(k)(Z.(k)-W.(k))Z 2 k=l 1 1 1
+ Qi(k)(xi(k)-Pi(k)xj (k)-Vi(k))2}, i-1,2, (5.7)
where R^(k) and R2(k) are strictly positive real numbers and Q^(k), Q2(k),
P (k) , and P2(k) are nonne8ative real numbers for each k. Thus each nation
wishes to narrow the gap between its armament level and an affine function of
its opponent's armament level,while at the same time minimizing its armament 
expenditures.
Using dynamic programming the feedback Nash equilibrium solutions 
are found to be
Z^n) = A11(n)x1(n) + A12(n)x2(n) + B^n) (5.8)
Z2(n) = A21(n)x1(n) + A22(n)x2(n) + B2(n) (5.9)
where A (n) and B (n) satisfy some recursive equations. When substituted in 
ij i
(5.5) and (5.6), the final feedback Nash equilibrium model is given by
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x^(k+l) = (31 + A 11(k))x1(k) + Al2(k)x2(k)+B1(k) (5.10)
x2(k+l) = (32 + A22(k))x2(k)+A21(k)x1(k)+B2(k). (5.11)
Thus the coefficients in the discrete-time Richardson model of (5.3) and (5.4) 
may be related to the depreciation coefficients in (5.5) and (5.6), and to 
the coefficients of the objective functions in (5.7) associated with a multi­
person decision problem. Thus the modeling problem is shifted to a choice of 
weighting coefficients in the objective functions of (5.7). For more details 
see Simaan and Cruz (1975a). An outline for obtaining the feedback Stackelberg 
solution for this arms race problem is given in Simaan and Cruz (1976).
5.2. Dynamic Duopoly with Production Constraints
In Simaan and Takayama (1978), a dynamic duopoly model with a 
linear demand of the form
p = C - ap - b(x^ + x2) (5.12)
where p is the commodity price and x^ is the output of firm i. The cost of 
production is
g . U . )  = \  a ± K ±> ± = 1,2  , (5 .13 )
and the total profit for firm i over the horizon T is
T 1
II (x ,x ) = / exp(-rt)[px^ - —  a^x^]dt (5.14)
o
for i=l,2. The productions x^ are to be chosen as functions of the instan­
taneous price p(t) and it is assumed that the production capacity constraints
are
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0 < xi[t,p(t)] < X., i = 1,2. (5.15)
Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium solutions are investigated in 
Simaan and Takayama (1978), where nine possibilities are explored, 
depending on whether firm i is not producing, producing at maximum capacity, 
acting as a monopolist, or playing as a true duopolist. For more details, 
see Simaan and Takayama (1978).
5.3. Electricity Pricing
Consider a simple model for electricity pricing, where the consumer 
chooses a level of consumption q to maximize his "consumer surplus" which is 
affected by the price of electricity. The electric utility chooses the 
revenue function r(q) to maximize its profit subject to capacity and subject 
to regulation. Such a problem was considered as a Stackelberg problem,with 
the utility as leader and the consumer as follower, by Ho, Luh, and 
Muralidharan (1981). Let the consumer surplus be modeled by
where S and q are positive constants, r(q) is a monotonic increasing piece- 
wise linear function representing cost to the consumer (revenue to the utility). 
The profit of the utility is
jf = i s [q2 ” (q-q)2] - r(q) (5.16)
T , \ 1 2JL = r (q) - -  cq , (5.17)
the capacity constraint is
q < q (5.18)
and the regulation constraint is
63
J < kq (5.19)
Li
where c, q, and k are positive constants. The information structure is
n„ : no informationF
<»•
Ho, Luh, and Muralidharan (1981) determined that
r(q) = pq + F (5.20)
is a Stackelberg strategy, where
p = S(q-q) > 0 (5.21)
F = kq + j  cq2 - Sq(q-q) . (5.22)
The solution in (5.20), (5.21), and (5.22) has the property that J i s
maximized with respect to r and q. Furthermore, with r(q) given as in (5.20),
the optimum value of q for the consumer is q, the capacity of the utility.





In this chapter we discussed some key concepts and methods relevant 
to multi-person decision-making and optimization in dynamic systems. In large 
scale physical models, dynamic operations research models, and policy and 
planning models, it is important and crucial to explicitly model the roles 
of multiple decision makers if, indeed,there is more than one entity that 
makes choices. For certain purposes, such as in policy analysis, it may be 
adequate to recognize only one decision maker and subsume other decision­
making aspects in general sectors. However, in the investigation of effects 
of significant policy changes, based on a model calibrated from data on 
previous policies, the predicted outcome may be misleading because when the 
policy is changed, the reactions of the subsumed decision makers may change 
so that the fixed model being used may not be satisfactory anymore. It would 
be preferable to explicitly model the presence of the other decision makers.
For situations where cooperation among decision-makers is desir­
able, the concept of Pareto optimality is appropriate. However, in non- 
cooperative situations the Nash equilibrium concept is more natural. Hier­
archies in decision-making lead to the concept of Stachelberg or leader- 
follower strategies. These concepts are described in this chapter for both 
deterministic and stochastic systems.
A critical consideration in multi-person optimization problems is 
the information structure. In contrast to single person decision making 
which necessarily involves centralized information, the multi-person decision­
making problem may involve decentralized information. Furthermore, the
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assumption of memory in the measurement, even in the deterministic case, gen­
erally leads to a solution different from that with no-memory in the multi­
person case. In contrast, memory in the measurement has no effect on the 
optimal solution for single person optimization problems.
For simplicity in exposition, only the class of discrete-time dynam­
ic systems is treated. The concepts discussed in the chapter are also applica­
ble to continuous-time dynamic systems.
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